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Abstract 
Unlike the usual research paper where answers to specific questions are sketched, the aim of this article is rather to 
device some worth answering questions. Could it be that embracing our errors (i.e., accepting the possibility to err) 
represents a protective factor in the effort to prevent them? A new research program intended to investigate the role 
of attitudes and their relationship with the frequency and amplitude of human errors is proposed. In the context where 
errors are not associated with serious negative consequences, the research program contains both correlation and 
experimental designs. In the end, the risks associated with novel approaches are briefly mentioned. 
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1. Introduction 
An error is “the state or condition of being wrong in conduct or judgment” (The Oxford Dictionary). 
Errors are deviations from external reality, accuracy or correctness. Generally, errors spring from the gap 
between the human mental representation of the world and the world as it really is. This gap between the 
objective reality and the way we perceive it can be about every aspect of reality (i.e., from verifiable facts 
to unverifiable memories or beliefs; Schulz, 2010). This unavoidable and profoundly human experience is 
spontaneous, unexpected, and undesired (Peters & Peters, 2006). Moreover, the errors we enact show that 
the content of our mind can be as convincing as reality itself (Schulz, 2010). Otherwise, we would not be 
surprised when comparing the two inconsistent perceptions. 
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1.1. Models of error 
Schulz (2010) proposed two distinct models of error displayed symmetrically on the pessimistic–
optimistic continuum. According to traditional wisdom, Schultz suggests, error is considered dangerous, 
humiliating and/or harmful. The assumption underlying this pessimistic model of error states that humans 
should always strive for the truth. Any deviation from accuracy is considered abnormal, a perversion of 
the real order of things (Schulz, 2010). The mistakes people made (including our own) can be irritating, 
distasteful, deplorable and not funny at all. The pessimistic model of error tells us that errors are 
unpleasant, and to dismiss that fact would be insincere. However, this model reveals nothing about 
situations when making an error does not turn out to be harmful or disagreeable. Therefore, Schulz (2010) 
adequately argues that to account for the diversity of real-life experiences, we need another model. 
According to this optimistic model of error, realizing that we were wrong is not necessarily associated 
with embarrassment or irreversible negative consequences. In some circumstances, recognizing our errors 
can be surprisingly funny and/or illuminating, facilitating a rich learning experience. This category of 
errors (i.e., without serious negative consequences) should be perceived from a different perspective, and 
embracing them seems a better option compared to fighting against their inevitability. In support of this 
optimistic model, Schultz quotes William James assertion: “Our errors are surely not such awfully solemn 
things. In a world where we are so certain to incur them in spite of all our caution, a certain lightness of 
heart seems healthier than this excessive nervousness on their behalf.” (William James, 1896, p. 19). In 
this context, Schultz suggests that by considering errors as an unavoidable human experience we could 
better anticipate, prevent and respond appropriately to them. 
2. Problem statement 
Although these two models of error seem appealing and intuitive, to date no research studies tested 
whether they represent scientific facts or mere philosophical speculation. These models might contribute 
to a certain understanding of error, but in the absence of a solid scientific support to prove their reality, 
researchers could only hypothesize about their existence and possible implications. Therefore, the main 
purpose of this article is to make one-step further, in an attempt to advance the scientific understanding 
about human error. To test whether and under what conditions embracing (i.e., accepting) our errors 
makes us less prone to enact them, a novel research program is proposed. Previous research efforts were 
directed towards clarifying the condition under which post-completion errors occur (Li, Blandford, 
Cairns, & Young, 2005), and whether interrupting the participants immediately after completing a task 
makes them more likely to produce post-completion errors (Li, Cox, Blandford, Cairns, & Abeles, 2006). 
To the best of our knowledge, no previous study looked at the relationship between human attitudes and 
the frequency or amplitude of error. Before sketching the details of the proposed research program, let us 
spend a few moments on another important topic: if it is impossible to be error free, what strategies are at 
our disposal to mitigate the occurrence of error? 
2.1. Attempts to control errors 
If errors are not only unavoidable, but also difficult to foresee, what strategies can we use to control 
their occurrence? To date, many techniques and intervention procedures have been designed to prevent, 
reduce or minimize the human propensity to err (Larson, 2003; Peters & Peters, 2008; Truscott, 2003; 
Whittingham, 2004; Woods, Dekker, Cook, Johannesen, Sarter, 2010). Two main strategies for error 
control (i.e., the retrospective and prospective strategies) will be briefly presented. Within the 
retrospective approach, the causes of error are investigated after the event occurred. By a detailed analysis 
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of the situation at hand, some insights about human errors can be gained, and adequate procedures to 
prevent future incidents are proposed. Within the prospective approach, anticipating the occurrence of 
errors and eliminating them constitutes the key elements. Among the prospective approach, the quality 
control process called Six Sigma (Larson, 2003; Truscott, 2003) is worth mentioning. Its aim is to make 
product that satisfies the customer and minimizes supplier losses to the point that it is not cost effective to 
pursue tighter quality. By implementing this methodology, producers aim to reduce unacceptable 
products to no more than three defects per million parts, by constant feedback (Truscott, 2003).
Summarizing, these are just a two of the many existing strategies for error control. However, besides 
the deliberate effort to mitigate error, it would be interesting to know whether certain personality traits 
and/or implicit attitudes predispose us to, or on the contrary, protect us from making errors. More 
precisely, it would be worth investigating the spontaneous or automatic processes that might influence the 
human propensity toward error. To sketch an answer, scientists have to systematically investigate this 
question in different contexts and with different populations. This by now classical scientific approach 
called program of research is detailed elsewhere (McGuire, 1989). 
3. The proposed research program 
Unlike the usual research paper that struggle to sketch an answer to a specific question, the purpose of 
this article is rather to device some questions that are worth answering. Inspired by Schultz’s (2010) 
work, we ventured into a novel approach of human error, proposing a new research program to 
investigate the possible impact of human attitude on error.  
Before spelling out the details of the proposed program, it is important to briefly mention the main 
factors that give raise to human errors. Lack of knowledge, lack of skills, divided attention or cognitive 
resources, reliance on false information, emotional imbalance (Piattelli-Palmarini, 1994), and possibly 
people’s explicit and implicit attitudes toward errors are among the most causes of human error. Besides 
these endogenous causes of error, the context in which the human activity is carried out might predispose 
or protect people from making system-induced errors (Whittingham, 2004). For example, the general 
work environment, the human/machine interface, and even non-physical elements like the company 
organizational structure, and working culture all contribute to the likelihood of human error.  
In the present article we decided to focus on the endogenous or psychological causes of error not only 
because system-induced errors are comprehensively presented elsewhere (Peters, & Peters, 2008; 
Whittingham, 2004 Woods, Dekker, Cook, Johansen, Sarter, 2010), but also because, errors are “the 
ultimate inside job” (Schultz, 2010, p. 21). From among the endogenous causes of error, we selected the 
automatic or spontaneous ones (e.g., implicit attitudes) as they tend to reveal the way people behave in 
their daily life. Moreover, we would like to investigate the possible impact of attitudes on error in a 
context where errors are not associated with serious negative consequences. The main reason for selecting 
this context is that when serious damage are associated with certain behaviors, people tend to spare no 
effort to minimize the negative consequences. Although the role of voluntary efforts to minimize human 
error represents an important research topic, it might not be revealing for the spontaneity of our daily life. 
Therefore, in an attempt to disentangle the factors that contribute to human error, the role of attitudes 
and their relationship with the frequency and amplitude of error is to be investigated. To do so, a 
correlation design is proposed. Within this design, people’s attitude toward error, their train anxiety level, 
and their actual behavior is assessed. The attitude towards error is measured by asking participants how 
much they accept that errors represent a normal part of life, how surprised they are when recognizing an 
error they made, how fearful they feel when thinking about the possibility of erring etc. After completing 
such a self-report, participants are ask to complete a subsequent behavioral task (e.g., a computer game) 
recording the number of committed errors (study one). With such a design we could test whether 
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participant’s attitudes are related with the actual number of errors recorded during the behavioral task. It 
could  be  that,  the  more  participants  accept  the  possibility  of  erring,  the  fewer  errors  they  make.  In  a  
similar correlation design (study two), we could advance our investigation by including both explicit and 
implicit measures of attitudes. One of the most frequently used implicit measures of attitudes is the 
Implicit Association Test (IAT, Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz, 1998). The IAT indirectly measures 
the strengths of memory associations. In the second study we could use an IAT with the categories self, 
error, others, and success to assess participant’s memory associations between self and error as compared 
to the associations between self and success (i.e., the IAT effect). As a result, we could test whether 
participant’s explicit and implicit attitudes predict the amount of errors recorded during the behavioral 
task.  
Moreover, we could investigate whether priming people’s attitudes (e.g., for error or for success) 
affects their error rate in a subsequent behavioral task. This would be interesting because it might reveal 
the relationship between cognition (activated at the explicit or implicit level) and participant’s behavioral 
performance. As a priming procedure, either subliminal stimuli (study three), or the scrambled sentences 
task (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Srull &Wyer, 1979) (study four) is used. By presenting stimuli at 
the subliminal level, the primed concept is activated, although participants are unaware of the presence of 
the stimulus. For one experimental condition, the concept of error will be subliminally activated, while 
for the other experimental condition the concept of success will be subliminally activated. Then the 
behavioral performance of the two conditions will be compared. With such a design we could investigate 
whether activating the concept of success represent a protective factor for erring while activating the 
concept of error represents a risk factor.  
The same hypothesis could be tested using an alternative priming procedure: the scrambled sentence 
task (study four). Participants are presented with strings of scrambled words and asked to create a 
grammatically correct sentence using a subset of the words in each string (Bargh Chen, & Burrows, 1996; 
Srull &Wyer, 1979). The majority of the word strings will either contain words related to the concept of 
error (for one experimental condition) or to the concept of success (for the other experimental condition). 
Previous studies demonstrated that, although participants are aware of the individual words, they do not 
know how this task affects their behavior (Chartrand, & Bargh, 1996, Bargh & Chartland, 1999; Tulbure, 
2004). After the priming procedure, participants will be asked to complete a behavioral task (e.g., a 
computer game) and the number of errors will be recorded. It could be that, activating the concept of 
success before an unrelated behavioral task would motivate participants to allocate more resources to the 
task, and be more confident about their own abilities.  
If our hypotheses are confirmed by the data, we wondered what are the possible underlying 
mechanisms? For instance, if we find that participants who accept the possibility of erring make fewer 
errors during a behavioral task, how can we explain their results? One possible explanation is that once 
people accept the possibility to err, they became less anxious, and consequently are able to better process 
the task at hand. Another explanation is related to the fact that accepting the possibility of erring makes 
people less surprised when confronted with their own errors, and consequently more willing to work hard 
at correcting them. In the same realm, priming the concept of success could activate participants’ schemas 
related to previous successes, increasing their self-confidence. However, to ensure that we have the 
correct explanation, we should imagine all or at least some possible motives for which our explanation 
could be wrong (Schultz, 2010). That is why elaborating alternative explanations represents such a crucial 
step for every scientist. It could be that not accepting but fearing errors actually represents a protective, 
motivational factor in error reduction. Alternatively, accepting the possibility to err could actually lead 
participant to expect them at some point during the task, and/or to refrain any corrective or preventive 
efforts. Nevertheless, until scientific data are at our disposal, few conclusions regarding the relationship 
between human attitudes and the frequency or amplitude of error could be reliably drawn.  
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4. Final thoughts 
The proposed research program investigates whether thinking of success and accepting the possibility 
to err could represent protective factors in our effort to prevent human errors, when no serious negative 
consequences are involved. If the implementation of such a program will bear fruits, scientists will be 
able to skilfully craft a theory of error out of sound empirical arguments. However, considering the risks 
associated with novel approaches, the present research program might be proven terrible off the mark, 
leaving behind a minimal set of solid facts (possibly, about how things are not). Nevertheless, for the 
overall advancement of social sciences, this might be crucial when a creative future scientist is directed 
toward a more promising alley. 
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